DEREVYANKO AND TARASOVA v. UKRAINE
2026-07-23 · Did the respondent State violate Articles 5, 5-3, 5-1, 5-1-c of the European Convention on Human Rights on these facts?
The rule
Applied to these facts
Precedents
Both cases involve pre-trial detention imposed for offences within the Criminal Code chapter on offences against the foundations of Ukrainian national security, arising from wartime legislation, with complaints about the justification and length of that detention.
As in the precedent, the domestic courts in Derevyanko and Tarasova expressly grounded detention on findings of reasonable suspicion combined with risks of absconding, witness interference/evidence destruction, and reoffending.
The precedent applicants were charged with unauthorised dissemination of military-position information under Article 114-2 §3, whereas Derevyanko was charged with collaborationist activity under Article 111-1 §4 as a factory manager and Tarasova with assisting the aggressor State under Article 111-2 via a disguised medicine-shipment scheme — different offences and different underlying conduct.
Both here and in the precedent, applicants invoked Article 5 §1 alongside Article 5 §3, presenting the Court with the same characterisation task of deciding under which provision the complaint should be examined.
Unlike the precedent applicants, neither Derevyanko nor Tarasova is shown to have argued that the offence classification was arbitrarily changed to avoid the bail alternative; their objection was confined to the absence of reasonable suspicion and unsubstantiated risk findings.
The strongest argument against
The analysis correctly identifies that the provided materials are insufficient to make a definitive ruling on the merits of the Derevyanko and Tarasova cases. It accurately distinguishes the facts where necessary and notes the absence of the Court's characterization or merits assessment, which are crucial for determining a violation. The conclusion that no violation finding can be stated without guessing beyond the given facts is sound.
What the review flagged
The rule states that the Court characterized the complaints as falling under Article 5 § 3. The application then states that the Court *would* treat such mixed complaints as falling under Article 5 § 3. This is an overreach because the rule only describes what the Court *did* in the precedent case, not what it *would* universally do in all similar cases. While it's a strong indicator, it's not a binding rule for future characterizations.
The analysis notes that the applicants in the precedent case also invoked Article 5 § 1, arguing there had been no reasonable suspicion against them and that the offence classification had been changed arbitrarily. While the analysis correctly points out that Derevyanko and Tarasova did not make the 'arbitrary reclassification' argument, it omits to explicitly state whether they *did* argue 'no reasonable suspicion' under Article 5 § 1, which is a distinct part of the precedent's Article 5 § 1 argument. The analysis only states they 'contested only the existence of reasonable suspicion and the evidentiary basis for the identified risks' in the context of Article 5 § 3, but doesn't directly address their Article 5 § 1 argument regarding reasonable suspicion.
The application states that the rule requires the ordering court to have found sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion together with risks of absconding, interference with the investigation, and reoffending. While the quoted rule (Rule 3) does state that the District Court *found* these things, it doesn't establish this as a *requirement* for all cases under Article 5 § 3. It describes what happened in the precedent, not a universal legal standard that must be met for a detention to be valid under the Article. The 'rule' here is descriptive of the precedent's facts, not prescriptive of the legal standard.